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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND ALIENS
William S. Dodge* & Scott Dodson**
The increasing prevalence of noncitizens in U.S. civil litigation raises a funda-
mental question for the doctrine of personal jurisdiction: How should the
alienage status of a defendant affect personal jurisdiction? This fundamental
question comes at a time of increasing Supreme Court focus on personal juris-
diction, in cases like Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, Daimler
AG v. Bauman, and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro. We aim to
answer that question by offering a theory of personal jurisdiction over aliens.
Under this theory, alienage status broadens the geographic range for mini-
mum contacts from a single state to the whole nation. This national-contacts
test applies to personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant whether the cause
of action arises under federal or state law and whether the case is heard in
federal or state court. We show that the test is both consistent with the Consti-
tution and consonant with the practical realities of modern transnational liti-
gation. We also explore the moderating influence of other doctrines, such as
reasonableness, venue transfer, and forum non conveniens, on the expanded
reach of our national-contacts test. In the end, we hope to articulate a more
sensible and coherent doctrine of personal jurisdiction over alien defendants
that will resonate with the Supreme Court.
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Introduction
Litigation in the United States is increasingly international. Of the five
significant personal jurisdiction cases that the U.S. Supreme Court has de-
cided since 2011, three have involved alien defendants.1 In Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown2 and Daimler AG v. Bauman,3 the Court used
cases against alien defendants to limit general jurisdiction to those forums in
which the defendant is essentially “at home”—for a corporation, its place of
incorporation and its principal place of business. In J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro,4 the Court used a case against an alien defendant to try to
resolve the question whether putting goods into the “stream of commerce”
could establish the minimum contacts necessary for specific jurisdiction, al-
though the Court failed to produce a majority opinion.5 The presence of
alien defendants in so many of these cases raises the question whether the
due process limitations that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
on the exercise of personal jurisdiction should be the same for alien defend-
ants as they are for domestic defendants.
Existing personal jurisdiction doctrine under the Due Process Clauses
already differentiates alien defendants and domestic defendants in two ways.
1. Recognizing their propensity to be pejorative, we use the terms “alien” and “alien-
age” solely for the convenience of shorthand. E.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdic-
tion? Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes
Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 2 n.4 (1996) (“[B]ecause this shorthand has long
been the rule in the federal courts literature, I feel compelled to employ it in this Article.”). For
purposes of personal jurisdiction, however, the critical factor is not citizenship but domicile.
E.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011) (“For an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s dom-
icile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded
as at home.”). We therefore use the term “alien” to refer to foreign individuals without a
domicile in the United States and corporations without a principal place of business or place
of incorporation in the United States. We use the term “domestic” to refer to individuals
(including foreign citizens) domiciled in the United States and corporations that either are
incorporated in the United States or have a principal place of business in the United States.
While this differs from the definition of alien for purposes of Article III alienage jurisdiction, it
is consistent with the treatment of alienage jurisdiction in the diversity statute, which treats
foreign citizens lawfully admitted for permanent residence as citizens of the state in which they
are domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2012). For purposes of this Article, we do not address
U.S. citizens domiciled abroad.
2. 564 U.S. 915.
3. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
4. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
5. The two cases not involving alien defendants are Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115
(2014), and Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
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First, with respect to specific jurisdiction, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Supe-
rior Court6 held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien defen-
dant might be unreasonable despite the existence of minimum contacts:
“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”7 A
recent survey of post-Asahi cases concludes “that courts in practice only dis-
miss on reasonableness grounds where the defendant is foreign, whereas
they effectively never dismiss domestic defendants on grounds of reasona-
bleness.”8 Second, with respect to general jurisdiction, Goodyear and
Daimler’s “at home” test affects alien and domestic defendants differently:
while domestic defendants will be subject to general jurisdiction in at least
one U.S. state,9 alien defendants will almost never be subject to general juris-
diction in any U.S. state.10 Supreme Court case law therefore leaves specific
jurisdiction as the only alternative for personal jurisdiction over aliens in
U.S. courts.
Despite these differences in the treatment of alien and domestic defend-
ants, the conventional approach to the minimum-contacts requirement of
personal jurisdiction is that state courts, and federal courts exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(1)(A),11 apply the same standard to both
alien and domestic defendants.12 Specifically, to satisfy the minimum-con-
tacts requirement, a court may rely only on contacts with the specific state
in which the court sits.13
6. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
7. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114.
8. Linda J. Silberman & Nathan D. Yaffe, The Transnational Case in Conflict of Laws:
Two Suggestions for the New Restatement Third of Conflict of Laws—Judicial Jurisdiction over
Foreign Defendants and Party Autonomy in International Contracts, 27 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l
L. 405, 408 (2017).
9. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
10. See id. at 760–61. We exclude opportunities for “tag” jurisdiction—personal jurisdic-
tion based on service while temporarily present in the forum. E.g., Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Kadic v. Karad_iæ, 70 F.3d 232, 247 (2d Cir. 1995). This possibil-
ity does not exist with respect to alien corporations. Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d
1062, 1067–69 (9th Cir. 2014).
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (stating that proper service establishes personal jurisdic-
tion if the defendant “is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located”).
12. Most courts and commentators agree that a national-contacts approach applies when
a federal statute authorizes nationwide service. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Reorienting Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine Around Horizontal Federalism Rather than Liberty After Walden v. Fiore,
19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 769, 776 (2015); Daniel Klerman, Walden v. Fiore and the Federal
Courts: Rethinking FRCP 4(k)(1)(A) and Stafford v. Briggs, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 713,
716 (2015); see also Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 Tex. L.
Rev. 1589, 1601 & n.65 (1992) (citing cases). In this context, the national-contacts approach
does not depend upon the alienage status of the defendant.
13. See, e.g., Edward B. “Teddy” Adams, Jr., Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Parties, in
International Litigation: Defending and Suing Foreign Parties in U.S. Federal
1208 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1205
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro14 provides an illustration. The defendant, a British manufacturer,
sold metal-shearing machines throughout the United States through an
Ohio distributor.15 One machine ended up in New Jersey, where it injured
the plaintiff.16 The Court held that New Jersey state courts could not exercise
personal jurisdiction because the defendant lacked minimum contacts with
New Jersey.17 Reflecting the conventional approach, Justice Kennedy wrote
for a plurality of four justices: “[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-
forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”18 Writing for three justices in
dissent, Justice Ginsburg challenged the conventional approach by pointing
out that the defendant, by engaging a U.S. distributor, “ ‘purposefully
availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a
single State or a discrete collection of States.”19 Justice Breyer, joined by Jus-
tice Alito, wrote a narrow concurring opinion. While he seemed to agree
with the plurality that existing precedents required minimum contacts with
New Jersey,20 he also suggested that different rules might properly apply to
different kinds of defendants and, specifically, that the alienage of the defen-
dant might make a difference.21
We urge reconsideration of the conventional approach for alien defend-
ants. We argue that the relevant forum for determining an alien’s minimum
contacts should be the United States as a whole rather than the particular
state in which the court sits. As we explain, both the fairness component and
the interstate-federalism component of personal jurisdiction support a na-
tional-contacts approach for alien defendants.
Under the fairness component, the critical question from the alien de-
fendant’s perspective is whether it must defend in the courts of the United
States, not whether it must defend in any particular state.22 As the Court
recognized in Asahi, there are “unique burdens placed upon one who must
Courts 113, 113–31 (David J. Levy ed., 2003); 1 Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, Litiga-
tion of International Disputes in U.S. Courts §§ 1:2–22 (2003).
14. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
15. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
16. Id.
17. See id. at 886–87.
18. Id. at 884. Justice Kennedy also noted that “a litigant may have the requisite relation-
ship with the United States Government but not with the government of any individual State.”
Id.
19. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In my view, these facts do not provide contacts
between the British firm and the State of New Jersey constitutionally sufficient to support New
Jersey’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case.”).
21. Id. at 892 (“Further, the fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic,
manufacturer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more uncertain.”).
22. Id. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Like most foreign manufacturers, [McIntyre
UK] was concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but rather
with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States.”).
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defend oneself in a foreign legal system.”23 But from the alien defendant’s
point of view, the courts of New Jersey and Ohio are equally foreign.
Under the interstate-federalism component, whether the defendant is
domestic or alien makes a great difference. A domestic defendant’s home
state enjoys general jurisdiction over it, and having another state assert juris-
diction without minimum contacts “would upset the federal balance, which
posits that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intru-
sion by other States.”24 By contrast, because no state enjoys general jurisdic-
tion over an alien defendant absent exceptionally unusual circumstances,
one state’s assertion of specific jurisdiction on the basis of national contacts
“does not tread on the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any other
State.”25
Separating the due process analyses for alien and domestic defendants
would not only recognize these fundamental differences but would also re-
lieve the Court from the concern that a national-contacts approach to alien-
defendant cases would have unintended consequences in domestic-defen-
dant cases. In McIntyre, Justice Breyer worried that permitting specific juris-
diction over the alien defendant would equally subject an Appalachian
potter to suit in Hawaii.26 But our theory acknowledges that due process
permits different treatment of differently situated defendants. A U.S. plain-
tiff could sue the Appalachian potter only where the potter’s contacts with a
specific state satisfy either specific or general jurisdiction. That venue may
not be Hawaii, but at least one U.S. court would be available and relatively
familiar to the plaintiff. At the same time, a New Jersey plaintiff injured in
New Jersey by a British manufacturer’s product would not be barred from
U.S. courts when the manufacturer’s claim-related contacts with the United
States as a whole satisfy due process.
Of course, fairness issues will still exist for some alien defendants, like
Justice Breyer’s “small Egyptian shirtmaker,” or “Kenyan coffee farmer.”27
The point, however, is that the fairness issues in these cases are different
from the fairness issues raised by the case of the Appalachian potter, and
they ought to be treated differently. Some alien defendants will be protected
as a practical matter by their lack of assets in the United States against which
a judgment may be enforced, which will discourage many plaintiffs from
bringing suit against them in the United States in the first place.28 In cases
23. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
24. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As we explain below, this is true even if one state
exercises personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant based entirely on another state’s con-
tacts with an alien defendant. See infra Section II.B.2.
26. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 891–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 892.
28. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982)
(“A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and
then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”).
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where suit in the United States is still attractive, we show how the possibili-
ties of venue transfer within the federal system and state dismissal under
forum non conveniens help to mitigate Justice Breyer’s concerns.29
Other authors have advocated a national-contacts approach in various
contexts, including in federal but not state courts,30 for federal but not state
claims,31 and under the Fifth but not the Fourteenth Amendment.32 Our
contribution to this literature is the claim that the critical distinction is not
between federal and state courts or between federal and state claims or be-
tween the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather
between alien and domestic defendants. Only a few scholars—writing in the
1980s—have attempted to defend this distinction, and they have emphasized
29. See infra Part III.
30. See Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Juris-
diction in the Federal Courts, 58 Ind. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1982) (arguing for the elimination of state-
based personal jurisdiction in federal courts); Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 1245,
1274–75 (2011) (suggesting that federal courts be authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction
over both nonfederal and federal claims when no state can exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 Va. L.
Rev. 85, 86, 127–30 (1983) (arguing that federal courts should “apply the minimum contacts
test to the alien’s contacts with the nation as a whole rather than with the particular forum
state”); Stephen E. Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1301, 1303–04 (2014) (arguing for nationwide service for federal courts through legislative
action); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87
Denv. U. L. Rev. 325 (2010) (arguing for nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal courts).
But see Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 1–5, 11, 38–61 (1984) (exploring the constitutionality of a
national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction in federal courts but finding heightened
fairness concerns).
31. See Casad, supra note 12, at 1592, 1596 (arguing for a national-contacts approach in
federal-question cases based on a lack of interstate-federalism concerns); Peter Hay, Judicial
Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate Defendants—Comments on Recent Case Law, 63
Or. L. Rev. 431, 435 & n.23 (1984) (arguing that federal courts should apply a national-
contacts test to personal jurisdiction over aliens in federal-question cases); Howard M. Erich-
son, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1117, 1149, 1163–64 (1989).
32. See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the
European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 155 (1992) (as-
serting that personal jurisdiction in the federal courts under the Fifth Amendment is con-
trolled by “minimum contacts with the nation as a whole, as opposed to minimum contacts
with a single state”); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reas-
sessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455, 456 (2004)
(“[J]urisdiction should be constitutional [under the Fifth Amendment] on the basis of effects
in the United States.”); Recent Case, Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 835 F.3d
317 (2d Cir. 2016), 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1488, 1492–93 (2017) (“[F]ederalism justifications do
not apply to cases governed by the Fifth Amendment, where federal law applies uniformly and
it is the authority of the United States government itself that matters.”).
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either foreign relations,33 general jurisdiction,34 or federalism principles.35
We defend a national-contacts approach for specific jurisdiction over alien
defendants on fairness and federalism grounds and in light of the Supreme
Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions in Daimler,36 Bristol–Myers
Squibb,37 and McIntyre.38 Our proposal is supported by the twin principles
animating personal jurisdiction, is unaffected by foreign relations, is consis-
tent with the Court’s recent majority opinions, and offers an answer to the
Court’s inability to muster a majority opinion in McIntyre.
Other scholars have also suggested that a national-contacts approach to
personal jurisdiction over aliens should be implemented by statute.39 Con-
gress can authorize a national-contacts approach in federal court for federal
claims, even under existing constitutional law,40 but whether Congress may
do so for state courts and state claims presents issues that deserve more
sustained analysis of the proper scope of the Due Process Clauses.41 It is on
those issues that our Article focuses.
Part I provides an overview of the limits that due process places on
personal jurisdiction, particularly with respect to alien defendants. It notes
that while the Supreme Court already distinguishes between alien and do-
mestic defendants with respect to general jurisdiction and reasonableness,
the Court has not yet made the same distinction with respect to minimum
contacts. Part II argues that in cases against alien defendants, minimum con-
tacts should be evaluated by looking at the defendant’s contacts with the
United States as a whole, not its contacts with the state in which the court
33. See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 Ga. J.
Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 36–37 (1987) (using international norms to argue that aliens should be
subject to a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction). For state-law claims, Born
argues for a “modified national contacts test” requiring at least “some minimal link between
the defendant and the forum state,” id. at 40–42, giving his proposal some affinity with those
who distinguish between federal and state law, see supra note 31.
34. See Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforce-
ment of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 820 (1988) (“In effect,
then, the adoption of a national contacts approach may make it easier to establish general
jurisdiction, but should have little impact on specific jurisdiction.”).
35. See Janice Toran, Federalism, Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 758,
770–88 (1984) (urging a national-contacts approach for personal jurisdiction over aliens based
primarily on the lack of interstate-federalism implications); see also Degnan & Kane, supra
note 34, at 812–13 (focusing on federalism).
36. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
37. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
38. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
39. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 30, at 1303–04.
40. See infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text (discussing various nationwide-ser-
vice statutes).
41. Congress has, in the past, proposed bills to extend nationwide personal jurisdiction
over foreign manufacturers in product-liability cases, but those bills were predicated on ex-
tracting consent rather than on national contacts, presumably because of the latter’s uncertain
constitutionality. See Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transna-
tional and Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 591, 604–06 (2012) (discussing these bills).
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sits. From the defendant’s perspective, the critical question is whether it is
subject to suit in the United States rather than in any particular state; from
the plaintiff’s perspective, the fact that no U.S. state will have general juris-
diction over an alien defendant makes the ability to establish specific juris-
diction significantly more important; and from an interstate-federalism
perspective, using national contacts to establish personal jurisdiction does
not raise the same state-sovereignty concerns for alien defendants as for do-
mestic defendants. Part III explains how our proposal would work in prac-
tice by showing how the reasonableness factors, federal venue transfer, and
state doctrines of forum non conveniens serve to mitigate many of the con-
cerns about a national-contacts approach.
I. Alienage Status’s Influence on Personal Jurisdiction
This Part surveys the current law of personal jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clauses and pays special attention to whether and how the alienage
status of a defendant influences doctrine. The survey shows that alienage
does influence the reasonableness component of specific jurisdiction, may
influence the “minimum contacts” component of specific jurisdiction, and
does determine the practical effects of general jurisdiction.
A. Specific Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction—the authority of a court to adjudicate a matter
involving a particular party—began as a product of territorial sovereignty: a
court’s authority was restricted to parties and property within its borders.42
For state-court litigation in the United States, this principle helped moderate
interstate friction, and, in an era when most litigation involved natural per-
sons, the location of an individual could readily be determined.
That model became unstable with the rise of artificial entities and the
decline in importance of state borders.43 International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton,44 the seminal opinion establishing the modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine, departed from a rigidly territorial approach and adopted one based
on the defendant’s contacts with a particular forum. The test became
whether a defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’ ”45 The goal was to protect defendants from the
42. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878) (“The authority of every tribunal is neces-
sarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.”); id. at 722
(“[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory.”). For the claim that Pennoyer’s holding was not dependent upon the Due Process
Clause, see Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1249, 1254–55, 1288 (2017).
43. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (tracing the evolution of per-
sonal jurisdiction). For early complaints, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L.J. 289, 290–91 (1956).
44. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
45. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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burdens of litigating in “a distant or inconvenient forum” and to maintain
interstate harmony.46
As Section I.B details, certain close ties between a defendant and a par-
ticular jurisdiction—such as an individual domiciled in the state or a corpo-
ration incorporated in the state—automatically satisfy this test.47
International Shoe, however, addressed a company that neither was incorpo-
rated in the forum state nor had its headquarters there.48 The question for
International Shoe, then, was whether the defendant satisfied the “minimum
contacts” test through other means.
The Court explained that the test was founded on whether the defen-
dant’s contacts with a state made it “reasonable” for the corporation to de-
fend there, in light of any burdens on the defendant to do so.49 The Court
recognized that personal jurisdiction would be appropriate “when the activi-
ties of the corporation [in the forum] have not only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on.”50 By contrast, per-
sonal jurisdiction would not be appropriate when “the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities
[are unrelated to the] causes of action.”51
Within these bookends, the Court focused on the quality of the con-
tacts: when “a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state” and thereby “enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state,” the state may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant on claims
“connected with the activities within the state.”52
Later cases elaborated on this standard. The defendant’s connection to
the forum state must not be solely because of unilateral action by the plain-
tiff or third parties; rather, the defendant must have “purposefully avail[ed]”
itself of the state’s benefits and protections.53 The most recent opinions from
the Supreme Court on this proposition make clear that the focus is on the
46. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
47. See infra Section I.B.
48. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312.
49. Id. at 317 (“Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An ‘estimate of
the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))). As we explain below, later cases explicitly
bifurcated minimum contacts and reasonableness. See infra text accompanying notes 56–67.
50. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 319.
53. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 479–80 (1985); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295–96 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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defendant’s actions, not the plaintiff’s or third parties’ actions,54 and that the
specific claims at issue must have a connection to the forum state.55
This much is settled law. But the Court has splintered badly in two cases
involving alien defendants. These cases train the inquiry on how alienage
influences personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clauses.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,  the Court confronted a
case filed in California state court involving a motorcycle accident in Cali-
fornia.56 All the claims settled except for an indemnification cross-claim be-
tween the defendants—the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube and the
Japanese manufacturer of the valve assembly used in the tube.57 The Japa-
nese manufacturer of the valve assembly, Asahi Metal Industry, moved to
dismiss the cross-claim for lack of personal jurisdiction in California.58
The Court split over whether Asahi had met the “minimum contacts”
test of International Shoe. The facts were not in dispute: Asahi placed a sub-
stantial number of valve assemblies into the global “stream of commerce”
with the knowledge that many would end up in tires for motorcycles in
California.59 For the plurality, these facts were not enough to meet the mini-
mum-contacts standard; some additional “intent or purpose to serve the
market in the forum State” was required.60 The principal concurrence, by
contrast, would have held that Asahi’s sales, made with the knowledge that
the stream of commerce would direct a substantial number to California,
were sufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts with California.61
Importantly, although they disagreed about the proper test for minimum
contacts, none of the opinions treated Asahi’s alienage status as relevant to
the minimum-contacts analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.62
However, all justices agreed that, regardless of minimum contacts, the
exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would violate “traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.”63 Asahi thus established reasona-
bleness as a separate check on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, even
when minimum contacts may otherwise exist. The reasonableness test turns
54. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014).
55. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (“What is
needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the forum and the specific claims
at issue.”).
56. 480 U.S. 102, 105–06 (1987).
57. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106.
58. Id. at 105–06.
59. Id. at 106–08.
60. Id. at 112 (plurality opinion).
61. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. The Court noted, but found it unnecessary to decide, whether the Fifth Amendment
might allow Congress to “authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants
based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant
and the State in which the federal court sits.” Id. at 113 n.* (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 113–14 (opinion of the unanimous court) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); see also id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 121 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
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upon several factors, including “the burden on the defendant, the interests
of the forum State, . . . the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief[,] . . . ‘the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of controversies[,] and the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.’ ”64
The Court held that exercising jurisdiction over Asahi would be unrea-
sonable in large part because of “[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who
must defend oneself in a foreign legal system.”65 The Court further noted
that when the defendant is an alien, the “shared interests of the several
states” factor transforms into the shared interests of different nations, as well
as the United States’ foreign-relations policies.66
Asahi was a disappointment to many who hoped a Court majority
would clarify specific jurisdiction. But the Court did clarify that the alienage
status of the defendant is highly relevant to the “reasonableness” require-
ment of personal jurisdiction. A recent survey of post-Asahi cases concludes
“that courts in practice only dismiss on reasonableness grounds where the
defendant is foreign, whereas they effectively never dismiss domestic defend-
ants on grounds of reasonableness.”67
Besides reasonableness, the other requirement of specific jurisdiction is
minimum contacts. In the most recent specific jurisdiction case featuring an
alien defendant, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,68 the justices could
not agree on the relevance of alienage status to the minimum-contacts test.
There, a New Jersey resident who was injured by a metal-shearing machine
in New Jersey sued for products liability in New Jersey state court against the
British manufacturer, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., that manufactured the
device in England.69 McIntyre did not sell the machines directly to the
United States but instead sold them to its Ohio distributor.70 No more than
four machines, and possibly only one, ended up in New Jersey.71 McIntyre
knew that its machines would end up in the United States and probably in
New Jersey, which is one of the largest U.S. markets for scrap-metal ma-
chines.72 But it cared only about total U.S. sales rather than sales in the
particular state, and it did not have any direct connection to New Jersey,
64. Id. at 113 (opinion of the unanimous court) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
65. Id. at 114.
66. Id. at 115.
67. Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 8, at 408.
68. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
69. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 877–78 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 878; id. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that New Jersey was “the fourth-largest
destination for imports among all States of the United States and the largest scrap metal
market”).
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though representatives had made direct efforts in Ohio and other states to
develop business in the United States.73
The Court held that New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction over McIn-
tyre, but the justices could not agree on a rationale. There were two distinct
issues: (1) what constitutes purposeful availment, and (2) the proper forum
for assessing minimum contacts. With respect to purposeful availment, a
plurality (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas)
would have adopted the Asahi plurality’s view that specific jurisdiction re-
quires a purposeful and direct connection with the forum state beyond
knowledge that the defendant’s products would end up in that state.74 The
dissent (Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) would have adopted the
alternate view in Asahi that purposeful placement of products into a stream
of commerce with knowledge that they would end up in the forum state
establishes minimum contacts.75 And the concurrence (Justices Breyer and
Alito) refused to adopt either principle and instead found no personal juris-
diction on the facts of the case—concluding that knowledge plus one ship-
ment to the state, without more, is not enough.76
With respect to the proper forum for assessing minimum contacts, the
justices in McIntyre appeared willing to recognize the unique influences of a
defendant’s alienage status, but no position commanded a majority. The
plurality recognized that a foreign corporation “may have the requisite rela-
tionship with the United States Government but not with the government of
any individual State” but nevertheless adhered to an alienage-independent,
state-focused analysis for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.77 Indeed,
the plurality worried that importing special considerations for alien defend-
ants could adversely affect domestic defendants.78
The dissent, by contrast, would have taken the defendant’s alienage sta-
tus into account in determining whether its conduct had met the minimum-
contacts test. Specifically, the dissent noted that, as a foreign entity, McIn-
tyre viewed its American market as the whole United States rather than state
73. Id. at 878, 885 (plurality opinion); id. at 895–97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 882–85 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 905 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“None of our precedents finds that a single iso-
lated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather,
this Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.”); id. at 888–89 (“[T]he Court, in separate
opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an
adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant
places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take
place.”).
77. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 885 (“[A]lthough this case and Asahi both involve foreign manufacturers, the
undesirable consequences of Justice Brennan’s approach are no less significant for domestic
producers. The owner of a small Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby distributor, for
example, who might then distribute them to grocers across the country. If foreseeability were
the controlling criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States’
courts without ever leaving town.”).
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by state.79 Further, the dissent recognized that New Jersey’s attempt to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over McIntyre—a citizen of no U.S. state—for in-
juries sustained in New Jersey by a New Jersey resident did not offend the
sovereign prerogatives of any other U.S. state.80 Finally, the dissent under-
stood that the plurality’s rule would allow alien corporations to use com-
mon commercial arrangements, like appointing a distributor, to avoid
minimum contacts with (and therefore personal jurisdiction in) any state.81
Accordingly, the dissent would have considered the alien defendant’s con-
tacts with the United States as a whole in applying the minimum-contacts
test.82
For its part, the concurrence expressed general concern with the diffi-
culty of crafting a general rule in light of the uncertainties of specific appli-
cations.83 The alienage status of the defendant added to its uncertainty and
caution:
[T]he fact that the defendant is a foreign, rather than a domestic, manufac-
turer makes the basic fairness of an absolute rule yet more uncertain. I am
again less certain than is the New Jersey Supreme Court that the nature of
international commerce has changed so significantly as to require a new
approach to personal jurisdiction.
. . . It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker,
a Brazilian manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, selling
its products through international distributors, to respond to products-lia-
bility tort suits in virtually every State in the United States, even those in
respect to which the foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a
single (allegedly defective) good.84
The end result of McIntyre is that whether and how the alienage status
of a defendant affects the minimum-contacts prong of specific jurisdiction
remains unsettled. By contrast, Asahi makes clear that alienage is directly
relevant to the “reasonableness” prong of specific jurisdiction.
B. General Jurisdiction
International Shoe also identified a class of cases that would automati-
cally meet the requirements of personal jurisdiction without resort to the
79. Id. at 904–05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“McIntyre UK dealt with the United States
as a single market. Like most foreign manufacturers, it was concerned not with the prospect of
suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the
United States.”).
80. Id. at 899 (“New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer
whose dangerous product caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the
domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any other State. Indeed, among States of the United
States, the State in which the injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a
products liability tort claim.”).
81. Id. at 902–06.
82. Id. at 905.
83. Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 892.
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tests of specific jurisdiction: when the defendant’s contacts with a state are
so substantial that it can be sued there for all causes of action, even those
arising outside of the state.85 The exercise of personal jurisdiction in these
cases is known as “all-purpose” or “general” jurisdiction.86
Four of the five general jurisdiction cases decided by the Supreme Court
since International Shoe have involved alien defendants,87 offering a key lens
through which to analyze the influence of alienage status. On its face, gen-
eral jurisdiction doctrine treats alienage status as irrelevant, but, as we show
in more detail below, the practical effect of general jurisdiction doctrine is
dramatically different for alien defendants.
The Court’s first general jurisdiction case after International Shoe was
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.88 The defendant in Perkins, a
company incorporated under the law of the Philippines and engaged in min-
ing operations there, had temporarily ceased its mining operations and tem-
porarily moved its headquarters to Ohio during the Second World War.89
The Court found that the defendant had “been carrying on in Ohio a con-
tinuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business” and so
could be sued there even on a cause of action unrelated to the forum.90 In
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, by contrast, the Supreme
Court found that a Colombian company’s activities in Texas—negotiating
contracts, receiving payments, purchasing equipment, and sending person-
nel for training—did not “constitute the kind of continuous and systematic
general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.”91 The test
distilled from these two cases (and “taught to generations of first-year law
85. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (acknowledging that per-
sonal jurisdiction can attach when “continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities”). See generally Lea Brilmayer et al., A General
Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 749 (1988) (“Before the advent of modern
transportation, when traveling was difficult and ties between jurisdictions were attenuated,
courts justifiably were concerned that defendants could evade suit by avoiding forums in
which potential plaintiffs resided.”); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 610, 622 (1988) (arguing that general jurisdiction arose to allow suit in a state
other than place of incorporation).
86. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919, 924 (2011);
see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1136 (1966) (developing the concepts).
87. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear, 564 U.S. 915; Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The exception is BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558–59
(2017).
88. 342 U.S. 437.
89. Id. at 447–48.
90. Id. at 438. Although the defendant in Perkins had sufficient contacts with Ohio to be
subject to general jurisdiction there, the defendant was still an alien because its place of incor-
poration and principal place of business remained in the Philippines. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at
761 n.19.
91. 466 U.S. 408, 416, 418 (1984).
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students”92) was that general jurisdiction could be based on “continuous and
systematic general business contacts.”93
The Court’s most recent general jurisdiction cases have substantially
narrowed that test. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the
Court considered whether general jurisdiction was appropriate over three
foreign Goodyear subsidiaries in North Carolina state court for a bus acci-
dent in France arising from allegedly defective tires manufactured in Tur-
key.94 The Court set out the test for a forum eligible to exercise general
jurisdiction: where a corporation’s contacts are so substantial that it “is
fairly regarded as at home” in that forum, with “paradigm” examples being
the corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business.95
Goodyear explicitly treated alien defendants and domestic defendants equiv-
alently under this test.96
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, residents of Argentina sued Daimler, a Ger-
man company, in California federal district court for claims under federal,
state, and foreign law for events occurring entirely outside the United
States.97 Daimler’s subsidiary, MBUSA, was incorporated in Delaware and
had its principal place of business in New Jersey but distributed Daimler
vehicles to all U.S. states, including California.98 The Court reaffirmed Good-
year’s test that “a court may assert [general] jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration . . . only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in which
suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at
home in the forum State,’ ”99 and it reiterated Goodyear’s “paradigm” fo-
rums as domicile (for an individual) or principal place of business and place
of incorporation (for a corporation).100 The Court left open the possibility
that, in an exceptional case, a defendant’s activities could render it “at
home” somewhere other than the paradigm forums and cited, as an exam-
ple, the unusual facts of Perkins, in which the alien defendant’s temporary
wartime relocation of its headquarters to Ohio rendered it “essentially at
home” there even though the corporation’s permanent home was in the
Philippines.101
92. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
93. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
94. 564 U.S. 915, 918 (2011).
95. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924.
96. Id. at 919 (referring to “foreign” defendants as “sister-state or foreign-country” de-
fendants and not distinguishing between them).
97. 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014).
98. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
99. Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
100. Id. at 760–61.
101. Id. at 756 n.8 (discussing the exceptional facts of Perkins); id. at 761 n.19 (leaving
open “the possibility that in an exceptional case [like Perkins] a corporation’s operations in a
forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State”).
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The Court also suggested, in a footnote responding to Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion, that a reasonableness analysis “would be
superfluous” in general jurisdiction cases.102 One might read the Court as
saying either that reasonableness is a component only of specific jurisdiction
or that reasonableness will always be satisfied in cases of general jurisdic-
tion.103 But in either case, as a practical matter, general jurisdiction under
Daimler is a one-step inquiry.
The Court’s new test for general jurisdiction is facially neutral with re-
spect to alienage: the “at home” test applies to domestic and alien defend-
ants alike.104 The effect of the Court’s test, however, differs dramatically
between domestic and alien defendants. For domestic defendants, at least
one U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction for all claims
against the defendant. For alien defendants, by contrast, the likelihood is
that no U.S. state will be able to exercise general jurisdiction.105 As Justice
Sotomayor pointed out in Daimler, absent exceptional circumstances a for-
eign corporation will be immune from general jurisdiction in U.S. states
even if the corporation does substantial business in all of them.106
The Court’s development of both general and specific jurisdiction dem-
onstrates that the alienage status of a defendant influences both the practical
effect of general jurisdiction and the reasonableness component of specific
jurisdiction. With those influences in mind, we turn to our approach to
minimum contacts.
102. Id. at 762 n.20.
103. The American Law Institute has adopted the latter view. See Restatement (Fourth)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Jurisdiction § 302 cmt. d (Am.
Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“Both general and specific jurisdiction are subject to
the reasonableness requirements of the Due Process Clauses. Because the contacts required for
general jurisdiction tend to satisfy these requirements, however, reasonableness typically func-
tions as an independent check on personal jurisdiction only in specific jurisdiction cases.”).
Professor Dodge serves as co-reporter for the Restatement (Fourth) but writes here in his indi-
vidual capacity.
104. The Court did state that “the transnational context of this dispute bears attention”
because of “the risks to international comity,” in that “[o]ther nations do not share the unin-
hibited approach to personal jurisdiction” and have resisted international agreements on re-
ciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments as a result. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762–63.
But that observation served only to reinforce the limited nature of general jurisdiction.
105. Id. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). As noted above, an alien individual (but not a
corporation) may be subject to “tag” jurisdiction based on service of process in the forum. See
supra note 10.
106. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Under the majority’s rule,
for example, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign hotel owned by
a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to account in a single U.S. court,
even if the hotel company has a massive presence in multiple States.”); see also BNSF Ry. Co. v.
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1560 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Foreign businesses with principal places of business outside the United States may never be
subject to general jurisdiction in this country even though they have continuous and system-
atic contacts within the United States.”).
May 2018] Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens 1221
II. The Case for National Contacts
In this Part, we make the case for a national-contacts approach to per-
sonal jurisdiction over aliens in both state and federal courts and for both
state and federal claims. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we
dispense with the claim—argued by a few scholars—that aliens may not
challenge a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Constitution.
Second, we turn to our central claim that a national-contacts approach to
minimum contacts for alien defendants makes sense from the perspectives
of both fairness and interstate federalism. Third, we note the benefits of a
separate rule for alien defendants that need not be extended to domestic
defendants. Fourth, we address some ancillary implications of a national-
contacts approach on transnational litigation, including foreign-relations
and enforcement concerns. Fifth, we demonstrate that a national-contacts
approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens is constitutional under both
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.
A. Due Process Rights of Alien Defendants
At least one commentator has argued that aliens may not challenge a
U.S. court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction because if they lack minimum
contacts, then they also lack due process rights under the Constitution.107
This commentator relies on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which re-
fused to apply the Fourth Amendment to a warrantless search of an alien’s
property outside of the United States.108 But Verdugo-Urquidez speaks only
to the Fourth Amendment and says nothing about personal jurisdiction, as
the commentator admits.109 Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the Fourth
Amendment “operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment,
which is not at issue in this case.”110 And Justice Kennedy, who provided the
crucial fifth vote for the controlling opinion, emphasized in a separate con-
curring opinion that “the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protect the defendant” at a criminal trial.111
Further, the reason the Court declined to apply the Fourth Amendment
in Verdugo-Urquidez is that the search took place entirely outside the United
107. See Gary A. Haugen, Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants,
11 B.U. Int’l L.J. 109, 115 (1993) (“Under the principles reiterated in Verdugo-Urquidez, it is
difficult to see why . . . an alien corporation outside the territory of the United States that had
never developed substantial connections within the country[ ] could make any claim to the
protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”); cf. Austen L. Parrish, Sover-
eignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41 Wake For-
est L. Rev. 1, 4, 7, 54–59 (2006) (acknowledging that current law treats alien defendants as
having the same due process rights as domestic defendants but arguing normatively that un-
tethering personal jurisdiction over aliens would have benefits).
108. 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
109. Haugen, supra note 107, at 114 (conceding that “the Court did not intend [to affect
personal jurisdiction], for it clearly had nothing about personal jurisdiction in mind”).
110. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
111. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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States.112 By contrast, an American court exercising adjudicatory authority
over an alien in violation of one of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses is
by definition violating the Constitution within the United States.113 Vergudo-
Urquidez’s reasoning thus supports the applicability of constitutional due
process to personal jurisdiction over aliens.114
Finally, the argument that Verdugo-Urquidez denies aliens the ability to
challenge personal jurisdiction on due process grounds ignores the fact that
the Supreme Court has repeatedly heard and upheld such challenges by
aliens, even crediting the due process–based fairness concerns they have
raised.115 It is for good reason, then, that courts and commentators have
overwhelmingly concluded that “the full protection of the Due Process
Clause should be available to foreign citizens summoned to defend them-
selves in United States courts.”116
B. Minimum Contacts in Alien-Defendant Cases
We recognize that there are different jurisprudential justifications for a
due process challenge to personal jurisdiction.117 Some commentators, for
112. See id. at 264 (majority opinion). The Court explained that, for trial rights under the
Fifth Amendment, for example, “a constitutional violation occurs only at trial,” but “[t]he
Fourth Amendment functions differently” and “is ‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion.” Id. (first quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
354 (1974); then quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)).
113. Whether the Due Process Clause applies to aliens outside the United States is more
contested. Compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitu-
tion, 95 Geo. L.J. 463, 521 (2007) (“Globalists have not presented any Founding era evidence
that ‘due process’ was thought to protect aliens abroad.”), with Nathan S. Chapman, Due
Process Abroad, 112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 377 (2017) (presenting such evidence).
114. In the context of notice, the Court has explicitly said that “there has been no ques-
tion in this country of excepting foreign nationals from the protection of our Due Process
Clause.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988).
115. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (“The
strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
Asahi under circumstances that would [be unreasonable].”); cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 892 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (articulating fairness-based, per-
sonal jurisdiction concerns for “a small Egyptian shirtmaker, a Brazilian manufacturing coop-
erative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer”).
116. Born, supra note 33, at 21–22; see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Ex-
traterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1220 (1992) (con-
cluding that aliens are entitled to raise due process challenges to personal jurisdiction); Lilly,
supra note 30, at 116 (same); Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture, Aliens and the Constitu-
tion, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 801, 846 (2013) (same); Toran, supra note 35, at 770–71 (same).
117. Some commentators have argued that the limits of a court’s adjudicatory authority
stem from sources other than the Due Process Clauses. See Sachs, supra note 42, at 1254–55,
1288 (identifying “general law” as the source of limits on adjudicatory authority); James Wein-
stein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doc-
trine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 171–72 (2004) (locating personal jurisdiction in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); cf. George Rutherglen, Personal Jurisdiction and Political Authority, 32 J.L. &
Pol. 1, 6–7 (2016) (noting that before the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause policed state judicial overreaching). Whatever the merits of this position,
the Court’s precedent since Pennoyer has solidified the centrality of the Due Process Clauses.
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example, have focused on “interstate federalism” as the root justification for
personal jurisdiction.118 Others have focused on fairness to the defendant.119
For many years, the Court prioritized the two justifications inconsistently,120
but in a case decided just last Term, Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior
Court,121 the Court tied the two justifications together. Noting that “the pri-
mary concern” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on personal jurisdic-
tion is “the burden on the defendant,”122 the Court explained that
determining the magnitude of this burden requires consideration of both
“the practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum” and “the
more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may
have little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”123 And the coercive
power of the forum state, the Court continued, is itself informed by princi-
ples of interstate federalism.124
Bristol–Myers Squibb is not entirely clear on how fairness and federalism
relate to each other doctrinally, but it does make clear that both have roles to
play. This Section thus analyzes both the fairness concerns and the implica-
tions for interstate federalism of exercising personal jurisdiction in alien-
defendant cases. We tie those concerns and implications to the proper scope
of minimum contacts in light of recent case law developments.
See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017) (“It has long
been established that the Fourteenth Amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state
courts.”).
118. See Casad, supra note 12, at 1591 (“The limits on . . . personal jurisdiction are proba-
bly better viewed as manifestations of interstate federalism.”); Degnan & Kane, supra note 34,
at 813–14 (asserting a “consistent theme” in the case law that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause “protects the concerns of sister states of this Union from transgressions by
each other”); Lilly, supra note 30, at 109–10 (noting that interstate-federalism principles
trump fairness principles); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 689–90 (1987) (arguing that personal juris-
diction is a product of sovereign limits and interstate federalism rather than notions of
fairness).
119. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical
Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1120–33 (1981) (arguing that state sovereignty and feder-
alism have no bearing on due process limits on personal jurisdiction).
120. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1980)
(focusing on interstate federalism), with Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement . . . . represents a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”). The
fractured opinions in McIntyre illustrate the continuing nature of the divide among the jus-
tices. Compare McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion) (stating that “jurisdiction is in the
first instance a question of authority rather than fairness”), with id. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he constitutional limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority derive from
considerations of due process, not state sovereignty.”).
121. 137 S. Ct. 1773.
122. Bristol–Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1780-81.
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1. Fairness to Alien Defendants
For a domestic defendant, the particular state forum matters. Domestic
defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in the state where they are at
home.125 They choose to reside in that state, with its familiar laws and proce-
dures, knowing that they can be sued there for any and all claims. Corre-
spondingly, domestic residents may be sensitive to defending in other states
because the burdens of litigating in other states, with the potential costs of
travel and relatively unfamiliar laws, procedures, and jurors, may be severe
compared to litigating in their home state. Given those sensitivities, domes-
tic defendants may even try to structure their business affairs to avoid cer-
tain states.126 Fairness is a key issue for personal jurisdiction over domestic
defendants, but it is an issue of relative fairness among domestic forums—
specifically, whether a domestic defendant may be sued in a state other than
its home state.
For alien defendants, by contrast, the particular state forum is largely
irrelevant. After Daimler, nonresident aliens are not “at home” in any state
(absent exceptional circumstances) and should not expect to be subject to
general jurisdiction anywhere in the United States.127 Aliens have no U.S.
home state with familiar procedures; all U.S. courts are foreign to them.
Whatever interstate differences exist among U.S. courts is of little concern to
alien defendants in light of the stark differences between litigation in the
United States and litigation outside the United States—including the availa-
bility of broad discovery, the prevalence of juries, the possibility of punitive
and other noneconomic damages, the requirement that each side bear its
own litigation costs and fees regardless of who prevails, and the propensity
of U.S. plaintiffs’ attorneys to use contingency-fee agreements—dwarf the
relatively more modest differences in litigation among the states.128 The same
argument applies to travel burdens; for the most part, aliens are far more
concerned about the travel costs and burdens of litigating in America gener-
ally than in a particular state.129 Finally, many aliens engaged in commercial
enterprises treat the United States as a single market rather than a state-
125. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761–62 (2014).
126. We address this possibility of defendants structuring their business affairs to avoid
general jurisdiction in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 149–152.
127. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
128. See Born, supra note 33, at 24 (“In general, litigation by a foreign defendant in inter-
national cases involves comparatively greater hardships than litigation by a United States resi-
dent in another state or region of the United States.”); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (listing strict liability, malleable choice-of-law rules, jury trials, con-
tingent attorneys’ fees, and broad discovery as differences between U.S. and foreign courts). Of
course, some aliens will be far less burdened in these ways, such as those from a nearby,
English-speaking, common-law country like Canada. See Aristech Chem. Int’l Ltd. v. Acrylic
Fabricators Ltd., 138 F.3d 624, 628 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e think that a Canadian defendant
such as AFL bears a substantially lighter burden than does a Japanese defendant—or for that
matter, most other foreign defendants.”).
129. See Born, supra note 33, at 38.
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specific market.130 Their concern is not to target specific states but rather to
deal in as many states as possible, regardless of which ones those are. Of
course, aliens may care a great deal about avoiding suit anywhere in the
United States. But once their contacts justify suit somewhere in the United
States, they ought not care exactly where.131
From the perspective of the defendant, therefore, it seems fairest to
think of minimum contacts as contacts with the United States as a whole.132
And if the alien defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the United
States, then it must be fair in an absolute sense to hale the defendant into the
United States to be held accountable for harms related to those contacts.133
Of course, the current doctrine of specific jurisdiction requires contacts with
the forum to be related to the cause of action,134 but if the forum is national,
there should be no barrier to counting related contacts that occur in other
states.135 And whatever level of “purposeful availment” is required to satisfy
130. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 898 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (focusing on the defendant’s “endeavors to reach and profit from the United States
market as a whole”); Hay, supra note 31, at 434 (“[T]he foreign-country manufacturer deals
with the United States as a single market. Its concern is presumably less with whether the
defendant is subject to suit in state X or state Y, but rather whether it is subject to suit in the
United States at all.”).
131. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the critical ques-
tion is whether an alien must defend itself in the courts of the United States, not whether it
must defend itself in any particular state); Born, supra note 33, at 39 (“Once it is clear that
litigation will be required in some United States forum, however, it often will be relatively
unimportant which United States forum is selected.”); Lilly, supra note 30, at 125 (“[T]he alien
defendant will often be indifferent to whether the suit against him is filed in State A or State
B.”); Toran, supra note 35, at 773–74 (“[F]rom an alien defendant’s point of view, any unfair-
ness in an assertion of jurisdiction is likely not to be the result of a suit in one state rather than
in another but the result of a suit anywhere in the United States.”).
132. Here, we have couched fairness as focused on fairness to the defendant, which is the
“primary concern” of personal jurisdiction. See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 292 (1980). We discuss concerns of fairness to the plaintiff below. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 155–156.
133. See Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to
(Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 Am. U. L. Rev. 413, 418 (2017) (arguing
for an amendment to Rule 4(k)(2) to “cure the perverse result that some foreign defendants
can benefit commercially from the U.S. market yet avoid suit in any U.S. court”).
134. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)
(limiting specific jurisdiction to those claims “arising out of or related to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum”); see also Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on
Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 Lewis & Clark L.
Rev. 675, 684 (2015) (“Critical to the determination of specific jurisdiction is whether a plain-
tiff’s claim can be said to ‘arise from or relate to’ defendant’s contacts with the forum state.”).
135. The situation is different for a domestic defendant, who is subject to the specific
jurisdiction in state court only on claims that relate to that state. See Bristol–Myers Squibb, 137
S. Ct. at 1781 (“What is needed—and what is missing here—is a connection between the
forum and the specific claims at issue.”). In that case, the relevant forum is a particular state
rather than the nation.
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specific jurisdiction136 (a point on which we take no position) should be
based on availment of the United States rather than any particular state or
locality.
It is possible that unusual burdens associated with one state, as opposed
to another, could exist. Perhaps one state has a locality particularly hostile to
aliens or to the particular defendant.137 Or perhaps the state would apply a
substantive law particularly favorable to the plaintiff while another would
not.138 Or perhaps the win rate for a particular kind of claim is significantly
higher in a particular state.139 Or perhaps an especially isolated court would
impose significant inconveniences on an alien defendant.140 And perhaps
these possibilities would drive the plaintiff to choose such a court over a
more convenient forum.141 We address these concerns in more detail in Part
III, but suffice it to say for now that there is a difference between burdens
and inconveniences like these and fairness for purposes of personal jurisdic-
tion. Not every inconvenience is constitutionally significant. Indeed, similar
disparities in burdens likely exist among a single state’s courts too, yet the
minimum-contacts component of personal jurisdiction has nothing to say
about them. The burdens and inconveniences of a particular location are
appropriately considered after minimum contacts have been established with
the relevant forum, in accordance with the reasonableness factors of per-
sonal jurisdiction and with subconstitutional doctrines like venue.142
136. Compare McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882–85 (plurality opinion) (requiring specific target-
ing of the forum), with id. at 907–08 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing more on reasonable
foreseeability). For an alternate view, see Rutherglen, supra note 117, at 3–4, arguing that the
focus should be on whether the defendant had reasonable opportunities to avoid personal
jurisdiction in the particular forum.
137. See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. Legal Analysis 245,
247–48 (2014) (exploring the relationship between local bias and personal jurisdiction); Sachs,
supra note 30, at 1324 (acknowledging the concern of “judicial hellholes” in some states). But
see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts,
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1120, 1122 (1996) (finding no empirical support for the claim that Ameri-
can courts are biased against aliens).
138. See Sachs, supra note 30, at 1340 (“With the expanded options created by nationwide
jurisdiction, plaintiffs could easily shop for a venue with friendly choice-of-law rules . . . .”).
139. See Thomas H. Cohen, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ
206240, Tort Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, at 11 (2004) https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8783-B5GY] (reporting percent-
ages of plaintiffs winning tort cases in state courts).
140. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 815–16 (“It is true that in a country as large as
the United States, it may matter which American court can act, and that determination em-
braces some important notions of fairness.”). But see Klerman, supra note 137, at 246 (sug-
gesting that litigation costs based on inconvenience may be fairly minimal in today’s age of
electronic communication and ease of travel).
141. See Sachs, supra note 30, at 1306–07 (asserting that “[s]tate courts are very different
from one another” in terms of likely outcome and that those differences drive forum
shopping).
142. Cf. Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 815 (supporting nationwide jurisdiction in the
federal courts and arguing that locality-based fairness concerns should be dealt with through
venue doctrine); Sachs, supra note 30, at 1321–22 (focusing on venue and choice-of-law rules).
The Eastern District of Texas, for example, has recently been a magnet for patent-infringement
May 2018] Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens 1227
The rejoinder of most defendants is to focus on the burdens of being
subjected to a lawsuit anywhere in the United States as opposed to in some
other country. Those burdens include differences in procedural and sub-
stantive laws, unfamiliar legal structures and norms, language barriers and
cultural differences, and logistical issues, such as time differences, mail de-
lays, and transportation hassles.143 These burdens might affect Justice
Breyer’s “small Egyptian shirtmaker” and “Kenyan coffee farmer”144 acutely,
assuming they had sufficient assets in the United States to make a suit worth
bringing in the first place.
But there are three reasons why these burdens do not undermine a na-
tional-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction. First, these burdens are
national in scope. They confirm that fairness to alien defendants turns not
on differences among states but on differences between the United States
and a different country. In short, the national scope of the burdens on alien
defendants supports, rather than undermines, a national-contacts approach
to personal jurisdiction.
Second, the reasonableness component of personal jurisdiction doctrine
already accounts for these burdens on alien defendants.145 Asahi directs
courts to consider “the burden on the defendant” in evaluating the reasona-
bleness of the exercise of personal jurisdiction.146 It recognizes that in alien-
defendant cases the “unique burdens placed upon one who must defend
claims. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241, 250–70 (2016).
Notably, the Supreme Court addressed such intrasystem forum shopping through venue
rather than personal jurisdiction. See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137
S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
143. See Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 104 (5th ed. 2011) (“The inconvenience that results from requiring a
defendant (or plaintiff) to litigate in a foreign country is often greater than that resulting from
requiring an American to litigate in another part of the United States. Major differences in
procedural and substantive rules—such as the scope of discovery, the existence of fee-shifting
provisions or contingent fee arrangements, and the right to a jury trial—are also more likely in
the international context.”); Born, supra note 33, at 24–25 (identifying legal, cultural, and
language differences, time zones and travel, and potential biases against aliens); Linda J. Silber-
man, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. Int’l L.J. 501, 502 (1993)
(reporting American advantages of the existence of juries, broad discovery, contingent-fee ar-
rangements, the American Rule of fee-and-cost payment, convenience, and often more
favorable substantive law); cf. Scott Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60
Ala. L. Rev. 133, 141 (2008) (reviewing Oscar G. Chase et al., Civil Litigation in Com-
parative Context (2007)) (discussing the procedural exceptionalism of the United States).
144. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 892 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
As we discuss below, small foreign defendants are unlikely to have assets in the United States
against which a U.S. judgment may be enforced. The prospect of having to enforce any U.S.
judgment in the defendant’s home country may discourage some plaintiffs from bringing suit
in the first place. See infra Section III.D.
145. We note, too, that some of the defense-side burdens can be lessened through applica-
tion of the subconstitutional doctrines of venue, which are specifically designed to address
them. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
146. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
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oneself in a foreign legal system” will command significant weight.147 Impor-
tantly, the reasonableness factors are assessed independently of the mini-
mum-contacts analysis148 and thus have no bearing on the propriety of a
national-contacts approach.
Third, it cannot be unfair to apply a national-contacts approach when
alien defendants structure their dealings to avoid minimum contacts in any
one state and thereby avoid personal jurisdiction anywhere in the United
States. Both courts and commentators have surmised that alien businesses
may attempt to arrange their business dealings in this way. Alien businesses
could diffuse their operations across states so that they lack minimum con-
tacts with any one state even though they may have minimum contacts with
the American market as a whole149 or purposefully target the American mar-
ket but avoid purposefully targeting specific states.150 The Court’s narrowing
of general jurisdiction only to the place where the defendant is “at home”151
essentially takes general jurisdiction in the United States off the table for
such alien defendants,152 and the current doctrine of state-specific minimum
contacts would allow such aliens to avoid specific jurisdiction anywhere in
the United States. A national-contacts approach to specific jurisdiction
would solve this problem in most cases153 and restore the basic fairness of
147. Id. at 113–14.
148. See id. at 114; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)
(“Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial
justice.’ ” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945))).
149. See, e.g., Casad, supra note 12, at 1596 (“[A] foreign defendant having ample contacts
with the United States will be held immune from personal jurisdiction in federal question
cases arising from those contacts if the defendant lacks sufficient contact with any one state.”);
Hay, supra note 31, at 433 (worrying that “a foreign-country corporation [could] limit its
exposure to the exercise of jurisdiction in this country” by structuring its commercial arrange-
ments strategically); Toran, supra note 35, at 773 (surmising “a fear that alien businesses may
be able to structure their commercial dealings in the United Sates to avoid establishing suffi-
cient contacts with any one state and thus to avoid jurisdiction in this country”).
150. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 901 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (calling such arrangements “common in today’s commercial world”).
151. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
152. Before Daimler, some writers predicted that the main impact of a national-contacts
approach would be on general jurisdiction. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 820 (“In
effect, then, the adoption of a national contacts approach may make it easier to establish
general jurisdiction, but should have little impact on specific jurisdiction.”). Obviously, that is
no longer the case.
153. See Born, supra note 33, at 38 (making this observation); Lilly, supra note 30, at
116–17 (same); cf. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1318 (“While some foreign defendants lack ade-
quate contacts even with the United States as a whole, those foreign defendants are the excep-
tion, not the rule. Most suits involve conduct that itself establishes U.S. jurisdiction, if not the
jurisdiction of any particular state.”).
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holding an alien accountable in the United States when the alien’s own con-
duct establishes minimum contacts with the United States.154
Finally, the plaintiff’s interests also support a national-contacts ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction over alien defendants. These interests have
become more pressing as general jurisdiction has narrowed to preclude suits
against alien defendants on that basis anywhere in the United States. The
“plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief” is an express component of the rea-
sonableness factors,155 and thus, the burdens on the plaintiff of being forced
to bring suit in a foreign country counterbalance any assertions of unfair-
ness by an alien in having to defend in the United States.156 Our argument
for a national-contacts approach does not depend on the interests of the
plaintiff. For the reasons already given, we believe a national-contacts ap-
proach is fair to alien defendants. But a consideration of the plaintiff’s inter-
ests adds weight to our argument, particularly for those who believe fairness
should be evaluated comparatively.
2. Interstate Federalism and Alien Defendants
Fairness is not the only component of personal jurisdiction. Interstate
federalism has recently made a resurgence in the Supreme Court’s analysis
of personal jurisdiction. “The sovereignty of each State,” the Court wrote in
Bristol–Myers Squibb, “implie[s] a limitation on the sovereignty of all its
sister States.”157 This state-sovereignty rationale echoed Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion in McIntyre:
If the defendant is a domestic domiciliary, the courts of its home State are
available and can exercise general jurisdiction. And if another State were to
154. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 898 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“On what sensible view of
the allocation of adjudicatory authority could the place of Nicastro’s injury within the United
States be deemed off limits for his products liability claim against a foreign manufacturer who
targeted the United States . . . ?”).
155. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
156. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 904 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Is not the burden on McIn-
tyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a reasonable cost of transacting business internation-
ally, in comparison to the burden on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England to gain
recompense for an injury he sustained using McIntyre’s product at his workplace in Saddle
Brook, New Jersey?”); Born, supra note 33, at 25 (“In virtually all international cases, an in-
creased litigation burden will exist for the parties regardless of the forum. As a result, resolving
personal jurisdiction disputes usually will not involve avoiding litigation burdens, but instead,
deciding which party will bear the unavoidable inconvenience of litigating abroad.”); Hay,
supra note 31, at 433 (“The plaintiff who is required to litigate abroad obviously will be more
inconvenienced than a plaintiff who must litigate in a sister state.”); Toran, supra note 35, at
788 (“The plaintiff suing an alien defendant is likely to face a considerable burden if jurisdic-
tion is not asserted. . . . The burden of litigating in a foreign country consists not only of the
expense and inconvenience of travel abroad but also of the more significant detriment of a
possibly inhospitable forum applying unfavorable laws.”).
157. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
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assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it would upset the federal bal-
ance, which posits that each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to
unlawful intrusion by other States.158
Although the Court has not clearly stated this point, we submit that
these interstate-federalism concerns arise only if the defendant is subject to
general jurisdiction in a U.S. state. That was true in Bristol–Myers Squibb,
which involved a domestic defendant.159 And although it was not true in
McIntyre, which involved an alien defendant, Justice Kennedy’s invocation of
interstate federalism still seemed to turn on it.160
A domestic defendant’s domicile in a particular state gives that state
substantial authority over it, authority substantial enough for the home state
to exercise personal jurisdiction over any and all claims against the defen-
dant. For another state to assert personal jurisdiction over a domestic defen-
dant is an intrusion on this authority of the home state and might be an
inappropriate intrusion unless justified by the kind of contacts with the sec-
ond state that would give rise to specific jurisdiction.161 But unlike a domes-
tic defendant, an alien defendant is not “at home” in any U.S. state, and thus
a state’s assertion of specific jurisdiction over the alien cannot intrude on
any home state’s authority.
It is possible that more than one state might try to claim specific juris-
diction over the same alien defendant with respect to the same claim. For
example, a product sold to a distributor in one state might cause foreseeable
injury in another; in such a case, both states might have legitimate claims to
adjudicative authority over the manufacturer. The Supreme Court, however,
has never analyzed competing claims of specific jurisdiction over aliens in a
comparative way. To the contrary, it has assumed that multiple states might
constitutionally assert specific jurisdiction over the same defendant for the
same claim.162 Indeed, in McIntyre, the defendant had more substantial con-
tacts with the state of Ohio than with New Jersey, including a long-term
158. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion).
159. Bristol–Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1777–78.
160. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 884–85 (plurality opinion) (stating that inappropriate as-
sertions of jurisdiction would upset the federal balance “[i]f the defendant is a domestic
domiciliary”).
161. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 95 (1978) (rejecting specific jurisdic-
tion in California while acknowledging general jurisdiction in New York); cf. Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (focusing on the requirements for forcing a party to
defend “away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business” (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930))).
162. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774–78 (1984) (allowing
New Hampshire to assert personal jurisdiction over a claim involving harm suffered by a New
York resident in other states). We note that Bristol–Myers Squibb’s requirement that the claim
be connected to the forum, 137 S. Ct. at 1780, seems to limit the range of states that can assert
personal jurisdiction over a domestic defendant.
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distribution contract with its American distributor, which had its headquar-
ters in Ohio.163 Yet, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, “New Jersey’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product
caused a workplace injury in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or
diminish the sovereignty, of any other State.”164
We recognize that a national-contacts approach does enlarge the num-
ber of courts that could assert personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant.
Under our approach, if the defendant establishes minimum contacts with
the United States, then the minimum-contacts test is met for courts in all
states, including courts in a state that has no connection to the defendant.165
But, to repeat, such a scenario both is constitutionally fair and poses no
interstate-federalism problems.166
To illustrate, say Nicastro had sued in Illinois, which had no contacts at
all with the alien defendant, and the Illinois court exercised personal juris-
diction based solely on the defendant’s contacts with other states. The Illi-
nois court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not unconstitutionally
intrude on the sovereignty of other states, like New Jersey, for several rea-
sons. First, the Illinois court would be exercising personal jurisdiction based
on national contacts, not just those in New Jersey. The particular location of
the host forum—be it in Illinois or New Jersey—is irrelevant for personal
jurisdiction under these circumstances because the forum is exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction based on contacts that do not depend upon state bounda-
ries in the first place.167 Second, if Illinois had no contacts, then the Illinois
court would be constitutionally prohibited from applying Illinois substantive
law.168 In fact, the Illinois court would almost certainly apply New Jersey’s
substantive law in this situation.169 Accordingly, New Jersey could not com-
plain of any infringement of its sovereign regulatory authority. Third, if the
Illinois court did exercise personal jurisdiction and apply New Jersey’s law,
then this should not count as an intrusion on New Jersey’s sovereignty but
163. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 896 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This fact has led at least one
commentator to suggest that Nicastro may have been able to sue McIntyre in Ohio. See
Rutherglen, supra note 117, at 36.
164. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. See Born, supra note 33, at 41–42 (recognizing this effect).
166. Nationwide personal jurisdiction over aliens in federal court has never been a consti-
tutional problem. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k); cf. infra text accompanying notes 198–200
(discussing various nationwide-service statutes). We address state claims in state court below.
See infra Section II.E.
167. Even if the alien defendant’s contacts with the United States were all in New Jersey,
Illinois’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would still be constitutionally fair and would not
raise interstate-federalism problems for the reasons that follow.
168. See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310–11 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[I]f a
State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and occurrence or transaction, applica-
tion of its law is unconstitutional.”).
169. Illinois has adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts for tort
cases, under which “the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the
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as an instance of interstate cooperation.170 This is particularly true given that
the Illinois court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction would not bar New
Jersey courts from taking jurisdiction if any party wanted to file suit in New
Jersey. Fourth, the Illinois court would almost certainly not adjudicate the
dispute in the end but would instead dismiss the suit under Illinois’s doc-
trine of forum non conveniens.171
In sum, alien defendants present not just different fairness concerns but
also different interstate-federalism concerns. It may not be entirely clear
what role interstate federalism should play in personal jurisdiction analysis
going forward. But it is clear that a national-contacts approach for alien
defendants is consistent with interstate federalism, whatever role it might
play.
C. The Benefits of a Special Rule for Aliens
We urge a national-contacts approach to specific jurisdiction only over
alien defendants. By contrast, we would leave intact a state-by-state ap-
proach to specific jurisdiction over domestic defendants, at least in state
courts. We thus part company with those who have argued for a uniform
national-contacts approach for all defendants in federal courts or in certain
classes of cases.172
The basic reason for the distinction is that the considerations of fairness
and interstate federalism for alien defendants are different from those for
domestic defendants. As explained above, being sued in the United States
imposes substantial burdens on alien defendants, but those burdens do not
parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.” Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Conflict of Laws § 146 (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 879 N.E.2d 893, 903–04 (Ill. 2007) (adopting this approach for tort conflicts).
170. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777–78 (1984) (characterizing
New Hampshire’s exercise of jurisdiction over out-of-state libel claims under the “single publi-
cation rule” as a permissible instance of New Hampshire’s “interest in cooperating with other
States”).
171. See Vinson v. Allstate, 579 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Ill. 1991) (noting that Illinois doctrine of
forum non conveniens “is applicable on an interstate basis and a case can be dismissed where
the ‘case . . . has no practical connection to the forum’ ” (quoting Torres v. Walsh, 456 N.E.2d
601, 606 (Ill. 1983))). For further discussion of state doctrines of forum non conveniens as a
means of mitigating inconveniences under a national-contacts approach, see infra text accom-
panying notes 254–255. To be clear, the constitutionality of the national-contacts approach
does not depend on a state’s willingness to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. But the
probability of such a dismissal illustrates unlikelihood of cases like this arising.
172. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 30, at 1–3 (arguing for the elimination of state-based
personal jurisdiction in federal courts); Casad, supra note 12, at 1615 (urging national contacts
for all defendants in federal-question cases); Fullerton, supra note 30, at 11, 38–61 (exploring
the constitutionality of a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction in federal
courts); Israel Packel, Guest Commentary, Congressional Power to Reduce Personal Jurisdiction
Litigation, 59 Temp. L.Q. 919, 920 (1986) (arguing for statutorily imposed nationwide per-
sonal jurisdiction for all federal and state courts in cases involving interstate or foreign com-
merce); Sachs, supra note 30, at 1303–04 (arguing for nationwide service for federal courts
based on political legitimacy).
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turn in any constitutionally significant way on the particular state in which
the defendant is sued.173 Nor does one state’s exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over an alien defendant compete in a constitutionally significant way
with any other state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over that defendant.174
For domestic defendants, by contrast, the distinction among states is consti-
tutionally significant, primarily because the domestic defendant has a home
state in the United States.175
An additional advantage of our alien-specific approach is that it as-
suages any concerns about unintended consequences for domestic defend-
ants. In McIntyre, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer assumed that any
rule of personal jurisdiction adopted for alien defendants would have to be
applied to domestic defendants as well. Justice Kennedy worried that a rule
adopted for foreign manufacturers might have “undesirable consequences”
for domestic producers, subjecting “[t]he owner of a small Florida farm” to
suit in Alaska.176 Justice Breyer expressed concern that a small “Appalachian
potter” selling cups and saucers through a large national distributor would
be subject to suit in Hawaii based on national contacts.177
Under our proposal, the Supreme Court need not worry about these
scenarios. By distinguishing between alien and domestic defendants, the
Court can continue to require that the Florida farmer and the Appalachian
potter be sued only in their home states if they lack minimum contacts with
other states. At the same time, the Court can allow New Jersey to exercise
personal jurisdiction based on national contacts over a foreign manufacturer
who has no home state in the United States.
By recognizing that the fairness and federalism concerns are fundamen-
tally different for these two groups of defendants, the Court can avoid im-
posing on either group a personal jurisdiction rule framed for the other. The
Court already distinguishes between alien and domestic defendants with re-
spect to general jurisdiction and reasonableness.178 We simply suggest that a
similar distinction makes sense with respect to minimum contacts.
D. Foreign-Affairs Implications
Although personal jurisdiction over alien defendants does not implicate
the sovereignty interests of individual states, it does implicate the sovereignty
interests of other countries. Some commentators have argued for more re-
strictive personal jurisdiction over aliens because of the foreign-relations
ramifications of questionable exercises of U.S. jurisdiction.179 Gary Born, in
particular, has expressed concern that some exercises of judicial jurisdiction
173. See supra Section II.B.1.
174. See supra Section II.B.2.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 125–126, 161.
176. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (plurality opinion).
177. See id. at 891–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 6–10.
179. See Born, supra note 33, at 34; Parrish, supra note 107, at 5.
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might violate international law180 and that “exorbitant jurisdictional
claims . . . can interfere with United States efforts to conclude international
agreements providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments
or restricting exorbitant jurisdictional claims by foreign states.”181 Although
Born ultimately favors a national-contacts approach, at least in federal-ques-
tion cases,182 these concerns are worth taking seriously.
The first concern about violating international law is easily dismissed.
As the new Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law notes, “[w]ith the
significant exception of sovereign immunity, modern customary interna-
tional law generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate.”183
Some countries do exercise personal jurisdiction on bases that other coun-
tries consider exorbitant.184 But the fact that a basis of personal jurisdiction
is considered exorbitant does not mean that it violates customary interna-
tional law.185 The accepted way for countries to police an exorbitant exercise
of personal jurisdiction is to refuse to enforce the resulting judgment.186 Far
from being a sign of a broken system, the nonrecognition of judgments
based on exorbitant jurisdiction is a sign that the system is working as it
should.
Born’s second concern is that exorbitant bases of personal jurisdiction
might interfere with the negotiation of international agreements. The Su-
preme Court also expressed this concern in Daimler as a reason to limit
general jurisdiction.187 The short answer to this concern is that specific juris-
diction based on national contacts is not considered exorbitant.188 In the
180. Born, supra note 33, at 28–29.
181. Id. at 29.
182. Id. at 36–40. For state courts, Born advocates a “modified national contacts test”
requiring at least “some minimal link between the defendant and the forum state.” Id. at 42.
183. See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: Jurisdiction pt. 3, intro. note (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). In fair-
ness to Born, at the time he was writing, the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law did
suggest international-law limits on personal jurisdiction. See Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 421 (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (stating reason-
ableness requirement); see also id. pt. 4, ch. 2, intro. note (“In the United States, and perhaps
elsewhere, it is not always clear whether the principles governing jurisdiction to adjudicate are
applied as requirements of public international law or as principles of national law.”).
184. Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 474
(2006).
185. Perhaps the best evidence is found in the Brussels Regulation (Recast) governing
jurisdiction and judgments among the members of the European Union. Regulation 1215/
2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast),
2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (EU). Although this regulation prohibits the use of exorbitant bases of
personal jurisdiction with respect to defendants domiciled in other EU member states, id. art.
5(2), it expressly permits the use of these bases with respect to other defendants, id. art. 6(2).
186. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 184, at 475 n.4.
187. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014).
188. The only U.S. bases of jurisdiction considered exorbitant are transient jurisdiction,
attachment jurisdiction, and doing-business jurisdiction. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note
184, at 477–82. The second was substantially limited in Shaffer v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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international order, state boundaries are invisible; it is the United States as a
whole that matters.189 As the Supreme Court has long noted, “in respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”190 Whatever impact
foreign-relations concerns might have on other questions of personal juris-
diction,191 they offer no basis for rejecting a national-contacts approach to
minimum contacts.
E. National Contacts for State Law and State Courts
We argue for a rule dependent upon the alienage status of the defen-
dant, not upon the source of law or the nature of the forum. Thus, our rule
would apply a national-contacts test for personal jurisdiction to aliens for all
claims, state or federal, and in all courts, state or federal. A national-contacts
approach to state-law claims in state courts is somewhat exceptional among
commentators,192 so this Section defends the scope of our rule.193 Our case
The third was eliminated in Daimler. 134 S. Ct. 746. This leaves transient jurisdiction—per-
sonal jurisdiction based on service while an individual is temporarily present in the forum, see
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)—as the only remaining U.S. basis considered
exorbitant abroad. Transient jurisdiction does not apply to corporations. Martinez v. Aero
Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1067–69 (9th Cir. 2014). For discussion of whether transient juris-
diction over individuals survives Daimler, see John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction
After Bauman and Walden, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 607, 614–15 (2015).
189. See Born, supra note 33, at 36 (“For purposes of international law and foreign rela-
tions, the separate identities of individual states of the Union are generally irrelevant.”);
Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 813 (“In the international order, there is no such thing as
Oklahoma. Oklahoma is an address, not a state.”).
190. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); see also Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 171 cmt. g (Am. Law Inst. 1987)
(“A State of the United States is not a state under international law since under the Constitu-
tion of the United States foreign relations are the exclusive responsibility of the Federal
Government.”).
191. Born argues that due process “should require closer connections between the forum
and the defendant than are necessary in domestic cases.” Born, supra note 33, at 34. We take
no position on whether the level of minimum contacts or the standard for purposeful avail-
ment should be different for alien defendants, although we think fairness is more relevant to
that question than foreign relations.
192. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. Some commentators have referenced
extending a national-contacts approach as far as we do, but they gloss over the legal implica-
tions necessary to extend it. See Born, supra note 33, at 37 (using international norms);
Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 812–17 (focusing on the lack of interstate-federalism con-
cerns); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Nationalizing International Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin,
36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 121, 140 & n.84 (1997) (referencing constitutionality); Silberman,
supra note 134, at 683 (advocating national-contacts approach through federal legislation);
Toran, supra note 35, at 770–88 (focusing primarily on the lack of interstate-federalism
implications).
193. States would, of course, be free to require state-specific contacts for alien defendants
in their long-arm statutes in the absence of preemption by federal law. Currently, about half
the state long-arm statutes extend to the full reach the Constitution allows. See Laura Beck
Knoll, Personal Jurisdiction over Maritime Defendants: Daimler, Walden, and Rule 4(k)(2), 40
Tul. Mar. L.J. 103, 121 (2015); see also id. app. (compiling state statutes). Under Rule
4(k)(1)(A), such state requirements would also bind federal courts sitting in those states. We
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for the constitutionality of a national-contacts approach to personal juris-
diction over aliens in state court under state law begins with an easy pro-
position: the Fifth Amendment demands only a national-contacts approach
to federal-question cases in federal court.194 Although the Court has never
expressly so held,195 it has strongly hinted its approval.196 At least one com-
mentator has concluded that the constitutionality of nationwide jurisdiction
in federal court “is about as settled by precedent as it could be.”197 Congress
has passed nationwide-service statutes on that assumption.198 The Supreme
Court has promulgated nationwide-service rules,199 and lower courts and
commentators have recognized that nationwide service triggers a national-
contacts analysis for personal jurisdiction.200 The Fifth Amendment, not the
would maintain this structure, which reflects the important principle that the outcome of a
case—particularly a case brought under state law—should not vary depending on whether the
suit is brought in federal or state court. See infra text accompanying notes 217–225. Rule 4(k)
creates exceptions for federal claims under some circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(C)
(jurisdiction established when service authorized by federal statute); id. 4(k)(2) (jurisdiction
established for claims that arise under federal law if the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
in any state).
194. See Born, supra note 33, at 39–40; Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States: Jurisdiction § 302 reporters’ note 2 (Am. Law Inst.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“When a federal court exercises personal jurisdiction, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction based
on sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012) (grant-
ing federal courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereign defendants using national contacts); Re-
public of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1992) (applying a national-
contacts approach to FSIA).
195. See Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017);
Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 & n.5 (1987); Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987).
196. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011) (“Because the
United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States but not of any particular State.”); Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at
111 (“A narrowly tailored service of process provision, authorizing service on an alien in a
federal-question case when the alien is not amenable to service under the applicable state long-
arm statute, might well serve the ends of the CEA and other federal statutes.”).
197. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1319–20.
198. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012); Securities Act, id. § 77v; Securities Ex-
change Act, id. § 78aa; Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a) (2012). The Multidistrict Litiga-
tion Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012), though lacking a nationwide-service rule, has been
construed as allowing nationwide personal jurisdiction for pretrial purposes. See Andrew D.
Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 3–7), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2792/ [https://perma.cc/
5XS5-NCBK] (summarizing cases).
199. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
200. E.g., Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wa¨rtsila¨ N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 462 (9th Cir.
2007) (permitting personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) to be based on national contacts);
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Where Congress has spoken
by authorizing nationwide service of process . . . the jurisdiction of a federal court need not be
confined by the defendant’s contacts with the state in which the federal court sits.”); Erbsen,
supra note 12, at 776; Klerman, supra note 12, at 716; Perdue, supra note 32, at 456. For
discussion of cases under former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3), which authorized in-
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Fourteenth Amendment, applies to federal courts directly.201 And, under the
Fifth Amendment, Congress could establish a single nationwide federal dis-
trict exercising personal jurisdiction based on national contacts.202
With respect to state-law cases in federal courts, Rule 4(k) generally in-
corporates the Fourteenth Amendment limitations on state courts.203 But it
does so as matter of policy, not constitutional obligation. This is evidenced
by Rule 4(k)’s so-called bulge rule, which permits jurisdiction over joined
parties who are served within 100 miles of the federal courthouse,204 a rule
that would be unconstitutional if federal courts were required to follow state
lines when hearing state-law cases. Again, only the Fifth Amendment applies
to federal courts directly, and commentators have overwhelmingly con-
cluded that whatever limits apply to state courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment do not bind federal courts even when they are deciding cases
under state law.205
The question, then, becomes, Why should the answer be different for
state courts under the Fourteenth Amendment? Technically, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause is distinct from its Fifth Amendment
counterpart. But if a national-contacts approach is fair for personal jurisdic-
tion over aliens under the words “due process” in the Fifth Amendment,
state service on out-of-state corporations for federal claims, see Kevin M. Clermont, Restating
Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 411, 428
n.88 (1981).
201. See 4A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069,
at 124–125 (4th ed. 2015) (reporting that courts applying Rule 4(k)(1)(C) have concluded that
the Fifth Amendment controls); Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 116, at 1220 (accepting the
assumption that the Fifth Amendment applies to federal long-arm statutes).
202. See Abrams, supra note 30, at 1–2; Borchers, supra note 32, at 155 (asserting that
personal jurisdiction in the federal courts under the Fifth Amendment is controlled by “mini-
mum contacts with the nation as a whole, as opposed to minimum contacts with a single
state”); Perdue, supra note 32, at 456 (arguing that “jurisdiction should be constitutional
[under the Fifth Amendment] on the basis of effects in the United States”); Sachs, supra note
30, at 1303 (suggesting “a system of nationwide federal personal jurisdiction . . . . over any
defendant that has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole”).
203. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service estab-
lishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant[ ] (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court
of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located . . . .”).
204. See id. (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant[ ] . . . (B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is served within
a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from where the summons
was issued . . . .”).
205. See supra note 202 (citing commentary). For an argument that state courts should
follow federal rules on personal jurisdiction when hearing federal question cases, see David S.
Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 56 Fordham L.
Rev. 1, 49–51 (1987).
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then it ought to be fair under the same words in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.206 For an alien defendant, as we have already shown, the critical ques-
tion is not which state will be able to exercise personal jurisdiction but
whether the defendant will be subject to personal jurisdiction in the United
States at all. From a fairness perspective, it would be as fair to subject the
defendant in McIntyre to jurisdiction in New Jersey state court as in New
Jersey federal court.
If there is a reason that state courts may not rely on national contacts
with respect to alien defendants, it must lie in the differing authorities pos-
sessed by the state and federal governments. One potential basis for differing
authorities is interstate federalism. This basis holds water for distinguishing
between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment in domes-
tic-defendant cases because of a home state’s special relationship with its
domiciliaries. But, as we showed above, a state court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction based on national contacts does not intrude upon the sover-
eignty of other states when the case involves an alien defendant. Because no
state can claim a special home-state relationship with alien defendants, one
state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction based on national contacts does not
intrude on the authority of any other state. When the defendant is an alien,
interstate-federalism principles offer no legitimate basis for distinguishing
between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment.
Stephen Sachs argues for distinguishing state and federal courts on a
different basis—namely, the political legitimacy of the exercise of a sover-
eign’s adjudicatory authority.207 He writes: “[T]he authority of a distant
court ought to be supported by some theory of political obligation.”208
Sachs’s proposal is to “assign litigation, to the extent possible, to a sovereign
with undoubted authority over the parties.”209 He argues that state courts do
not have legitimate authority over out-of-state defendants who lack mini-
mum contacts with that state because those defendants “haven’t voted for
the politicians who pick the judges” of that state.210 By contrast, all federal
courts have legitimate authority over all U.S.-citizen defendants because they
are subject to the authority of the federal government.211
Sachs’s argument works, of course, for defendants who are citizens of
the United States.212 But it is much weaker as applied to alien defendants
206. Cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To
suppose that ‘due process of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the
Fourteenth is too frivolous to require elaborate rejection.”).
207. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1310–14.
208. Id. at 1311.
209. Id. at 1315.
210. Id. at 1311; see also id. at 1312 (“No jurisdiction, one might say, without representa-
tion.”). Sachs does qualify his focus on representation. See id. at 1312 (“[W]e don’t really
expect jurisdiction always to be paired with the vote.”).
211. Id. at 1317.
212. See id. (“But the Constitution empowers the United States, of which the defendant is
a citizen, to try the case in a federal forum.”). Although Sachs’s political-legitimacy argument
in favor of national contacts works better for domestic defendants than for aliens, we note that
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whose subjection to any American political authority is attenuated.213 Sachs
does acknowledge that an alien’s “relationship to the United States as a
whole is a fortiori no weaker, and usually far stronger, than its relationship
to any one state in particular.”214 We agree, and to the extent the relationship
with the United States as a whole confers legitimacy, it is unclear why a
particular state could not legitimately exercise jurisdiction on behalf of the
United States based on national contacts.215
We agree with Sachs that it is legitimate for federal courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on national contacts. As he
points out, there are nonrepresentational bases for the legitimacy of adjudi-
cative jurisdiction.216 We simply think that those other bases apply equally to
state courts in the case of alien defendants and allow state courts to exercise
political authority over aliens on behalf of the United States based on na-
tional contacts.
If there is no good reason to distinguish between federal and state courts
with respect to alien defendants, there is one very powerful reason not to do
so: uniformity in personal jurisdiction rules guards against vertical forum
there is less practical need for a national-contacts approach with respect to domestic defend-
ants because those defendants will be subject to general jurisdiction somewhere in the United
States. See supra text accompanying note 125.
213. Aliens cannot vote in U.S. elections and are even prohibited from making campaign
contributions in federal elections. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (2012); see also Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.
Supp. 2d 281, 283, 291, 292 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a prohibi-
tion on donations by alien individuals and corporations and recognizing the Supreme Court’s
precedent that the government can bar aliens from voting).
214. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1317.
215. In an attempt to show the limits of state-court authority, Professor Sachs compares
state courts to French courts, Bill Gates, and the Pope, none of which would have legitimate
authority to decide a tort suit arising in the United States. See id. at 1311–12. But the compari-
son is inapt. French courts, Bill Gates, and the Pope each lack authority to act on behalf of the
United States. State courts, by contrast, can and do exercise such authority. Indeed, under
international law, the United States is responsible for the actions of state courts but not for the
actions of Bill Gates. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10 art 4, cmt. 9, at 41, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), re-
printed in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)
(noting that the national government is responsible for “a component unit of a federal State”);
id. ch. 2, cmt. 3, at 38 (noting that “the conduct of private persons is not as such attributable
to the State”). That the United States may be held internationally responsible for the acts of
state courts is one of the reasons Article III permits federal courts to exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction in most cases that are likely to affect noncitizens. See The Federalist No. 80, at
476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“As the denial or perversion of justice
by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the
just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.”). The precise balance between
state and federal courts in cases involving noncitizens is one the Constitution leaves to Con-
gress, which need not authorize federal subject-matter jurisdiction to the full extent permitted
by Article III. The point for present purposes is that unlike French courts, Bill Gates, and the
Pope, state courts can and do exercise authority on behalf of the United States.
216. See Sachs, supra note 30, at 1312.
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shopping and inequitable administration of the laws.217 If federal courts ap-
plied a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens while
state courts applied a state-contacts approach, then plaintiffs might seek
ways to invoke diversity jurisdiction as a means of establishing personal ju-
risdiction in a favorable state—such as the plaintiff’s home state—when the
state courts in that state would lack personal jurisdiction.218 Such plaintiffs
would also have an unfair advantage over similarly situated alien plaintiffs,
who would not be able to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction.219 Thus, “the
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal adminis-
tration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by
side.”220 Alternatively, plaintiffs might add relatively insignificant federal
claims in an effort to secure a federal forum. It is for such reasons of vertical
uniformity that portions of the federal-court–long-arm rule mirror state-
court personal jurisdiction.221 Adopting a national-contacts approach only
for federal courts would violate this principle of uniformity.
It would also increase the burden on federal courts and slight the role of
state courts in our federal system. Although diversity and alienage jurisdic-
tion allow access to federal courts in situations where there is reason to fear
that state courts might be biased,222 state courts remain the foundation of
the justice system in the United States. Allowing federal but not state courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction would shift at least some cases away from
state courts as plaintiffs sought a federal forum that could exercise personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.223 A national-contacts approach for alien
defendants does not pose a horizontal-federalism problem in the sense that
one state court would be intruding on the domain of another state court.224
217. These goals are sometimes associated with the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)
(referring to “the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws”).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
219. The Constitution’s grant of alienage jurisdiction does not extend to cases between
two aliens. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Mossman v. Hig-
ginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800).
220. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
221. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). The rule recognizes exceptions only for joined parties
who are served within 100 miles of the federal court, id. 4(k)(1)(B), when a federal statute
authorizes nationwide service of process, id. 4(k)(1)(C), and for federal claims if the defendant
is not subject to jurisdiction in the courts of any state, id. 4(k)(2). Cf. Paul D. Carrington,
Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 733, 746 (1988)
(using this point to argue for federal-court service rules that mirror state service rules).
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
223. The number would be greater if national contacts were used in federal court for all
defendants and less if national contacts were used in federal court only for alien defendants.
224. See supra Section II.B.2.
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But a national-contacts approach only for federal courts would pose a verti-
cal-federalism problem by allowing federal courts to reach cases that state
courts could not.225
In sum, the constitutional rules of personal jurisdiction applicable to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment should be the same as those appli-
cable to federal courts under the Fifth Amendment. If it would be fair for a
federal court in New Jersey to use national contacts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over an alien, then it is fair for a state court in New Jersey to do
so as well. State courts enjoy as much legitimacy with respect to alien de-
fendants as federal courts do. And applying the same rules for personal ju-
risdiction in state and federal courts respects longstanding principles of
uniformity and federalism.
III. National Contacts in Action
A national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction should not pro-
duce a forum that is constitutionally unfair to an alien defendant. Neverthe-
less, it is possible that a particular forum within the United States could
impose meaningful inconveniences or litigation burdens on that defendant.
An alien defendant from Vancouver, for example, whose claim-related U.S.
conduct is concentrated in Seattle, Washington, might face inconvenience
and other burdens if haled into court in South Carolina.
The minimum-contacts component of personal jurisdiction, however, is
not the only determinant of forum. Other doctrines can help isolate an ap-
propriate forum under a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction
over alien defendants, including doctrines of reasonableness, venue, and fo-
rum non conveniens.226 In this Part, we retrain focus on these limits, tailored
to our proposal and updated to account for recent developments.
A. Reasonableness in State and Federal Courts
The Supreme Court has made clear that even when minimum contacts
exist, the Due Process Clauses prohibit the exercise of personal jurisdiction
when it would be unreasonable.227 Although this reasonableness requirement
does not have much impact on suits against domestic defendants, it does
225. In other contexts, scholars have distinguished between horizontal federalism and ver-
tical federalism. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (2008).
226. Others have made similar suggestions in other defenses of a national-contacts ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 771 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); Abrams, supra note 30, at 36; Casad, supra note 12, at 1592;
Degnan & Kane, supra note 34, at 818; Hay, supra note 31, at 435; Lilly, supra note 30, at 148
n.240; Packel, supra note 172, at 920; Parrish, supra note 107, at 55–56; Perdue, supra note 32,
at 468; Sachs, supra note 30, at 1313, 1338; Spencer, supra note 30, at 333.
227. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113, 115 (1987).
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result in the dismissal of some cases against alien defendants.228 As a consti-
tutional limitation, reasonableness applies equally in state and federal
courts.229
To determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an alien
defendant is reasonable, a court must consider: (1) “the burden on the de-
fendant,” (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief,” (3) “the interests of
the forum State,” (4) “the procedural and substantive policies of other na-
tions,” and (5) “the . . . judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most effi-
cient resolution of controversies.”230 In Asahi, the Supreme Court stated:
“When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the
plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the
serious burdens placed on the alien defendant.”231 This means that suits
brought by U.S. plaintiffs based on harm that occurs in the United States are
unlikely to be dismissed on reasonableness grounds. But that is as it should
be, given the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining relief and the appropriateness of
the place of injury as a basis for subjecting a defendant to personal
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the reasonableness component may offer some protection
when the plaintiff is not a U.S. resident.232 In addition, it is possible that the
burdens on the defendant could be substantial enough to outweigh the
plaintiff-focused factors even in a case involving a domestic plaintiff and to
make the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular state unreasonable.
In the case of the small Vancouver defendant who caused injury in Seattle
and whose U.S. business is concentrated in Seattle, defending in South Caro-
lina might be unreasonably burdensome given the more reasonable forum in
Seattle. And the interests of the Seattle plaintiff and of the state of South
Carolina in a South Carolina forum are unlikely to be substantial enough to
outweigh those burdens. Reasonableness thus serves as a limited check for
exceptional cases in which a national-contacts approach would lead to unu-
sual burdens on alien defendants relative to the other factors in the reasona-
bleness analysis.
B. Limits on Suits in Federal Courts
A case in federal court is subject to rules of venue under federal law. In
domestic-defendant cases, venue law is restrictive.233 In alien-defendant
cases, however, venue law lays proper venue in any federal district court.234 It
is worth noting that venue’s approach to aliens is consistent with a national-
228. See Silberman & Yaffe, supra note 8, at 408.
229. This stands in contrast to the subconstitutional limits we discuss below, which de-
pend on whether the case is in state or federal court. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
230. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113, 115.
231. Id. at 114.
232. This was the case in Asahi. See id.
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012).
234. See id. § 1391(c)(3).
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contacts approach to personal jurisdiction.235 Our proposal is fully consis-
tent with the policies animating venue.
Importantly, however, the broad rules on venue with respect to alien
defendants are subject to the possibility of transfer to a more convenient
forum. The venue-transfer statute allows transfer “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses” to any district where the case “might have been
brought.”236 Because every federal court would have personal jurisdiction
and proper venue in an alien-defendant case, the venue statute allows such a
case to be quickly transferred to the most convenient and appropriate U.S.
forum. Although the burden is on the defendant to show that transfer is
appropriate, the Supreme Court has held that Congress “intended to permit
courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience” than
under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens.237 In particular, courts
will give relatively little weight to the plaintiff’s choice if it chooses a forum
unrelated to the case.238 The point is that any inconveniences imposed on
alien defendants by a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction
can be remedied in federal court by venue transfer. The small Vancouver
defendant whose business was concentrated in Seattle can thus transfer an
action filed in South Carolina to Washington. It is true that the comparative
conveniences among states may be less clear in a case against Justice Breyer’s
Kenyan coffee farmer. But that just reinforces the point of a national-con-
tacts approach to personal jurisdiction over aliens: in contrast to domestic
defendants, relative state inconveniences are often beside the point for alien
defendants.239
One nuance of national venue complicates matters: where the case be-
gins affects which law applies to the case, no matter where it ends up. The
usual rule in federal court is that the choice-of-law rules of the court where
the case is filed apply even if the case is transferred to a court that would
otherwise apply different choice-of-law rules.240 This rule means that the law
ultimately applied by a particular federal court may differ between a case
filed in or removed to that court and a case transferred to that court from a
235. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 39 (arguing that the venue statute seems to assume
“that, for an alien, suit in any district in the United States is just as convenient as any other”).
236. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
237. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).
238. See, e.g., Bowen v. Elanes N.H. Holdings, LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 104, 108 (D. Mass.
2015) (“Where the forum has no obvious connection to the case or where the plaintiff is not a
forum resident, the plaintiff’s presumption carries less weight.”).
239. Cf. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1327 (“Giving plaintiffs their choice of ninety-four federal
judicial districts would create a forum shopper’s paradise, in which the threat of suit in distant
and inconvenient fora—thousands of miles from defendants’ homes—would become a cudgel
for settlement. That regime would produce far more injustice than it would prevent.”).
240. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 524–25 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612, 634–35 (1964).
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different court.241 Because a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdic-
tion widens the range of forums in which a state-law case against an alien
could be brought, it may incentivize plaintiffs to choose a particular forum
because of the particular law that forum would apply.
Law shopping is an accepted and anticipated cost of America’s system of
horizontal federalism that does not concern venue transfer.242 Nevertheless,
Professor Sachs has homed in on this nuance to argue, primarily from a
domestic-defendant perspective, that the choice-of-law rules for venue
transfer should be changed under a national-contacts approach to personal
jurisdiction so that plaintiffs cannot shop for the most favorable substantive
law.243 We are not opposed to his proposed reforms, but we note that the
benefits of his approach for domestic defendants are less compelling for
alien defendants. In alien-defendant cases, the opportunities for law-shop-
ping-through-forum-shopping conduct are quite limited because the alien
defendant’s status as an outsider narrows the range of possibly applicable
laws. Few choice-of-law regimes will direct the application of the law of a
jurisdiction with only minimal connections to the case, even if the case
could be brought there.244 The alien defendant’s absence will train focus on
the smaller set of connections—and therefore on a narrower range of appli-
cable laws. In short, it is highly unlikely that a national-contacts approach to
personal jurisdiction over aliens will result in a case tried under the substan-
tive law of a state that no party anticipated.
Finally, the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens—which allows
federal courts to dismiss a case more suitable to an available foreign tribu-
nal—is also an option for aliens in federal court. One survey of federal dis-
trict court decisions found that forum non conveniens motions succeeded in
30.4 percent of cases brought by domestic plaintiffs and 63.4 percent of cases
brought by foreign plaintiffs.245 Thus, even in cases where the presumption
241. Federal courts apply state choice-of-law rules to diversity claims. See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
242. See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 524–25; Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 634–35.
243. Sachs, supra note 30, at 1338 (proposing amendments to “establish[ ] a presumption
in favor of venue transfer, eliminat[e] the deference to the plaintiff, and adopt[ ] choice-of-law
rules based on where the case ends up, not where it began”); id. at 1340 (discussing the adverse
effects of plaintiff-side forum shopping).
244. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2015: Twenty-
Ninth Annual Survey, 64 Am. J. Comp. L. 221, 291 tbl.2 (2016) (showing, in a table of the
choice-of-law rules for each state, that states overwhelmingly follow choice-of-law rules that
depend in some part on contacts with the state whose law is to be chosen); see also Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“[F]or a State’s substantive law
to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its
law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”).
245. Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 Cornell L. Rev.
481, 503 & tbl.1 (2011).
May 2018] Personal Jurisdiction and Aliens 1245
in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum is strongest,246 alien defendants
have a substantial chance of success.247
All this is simply to say that existing law substantially reduces—below
the constitutional threshold—the risk of unusual burdens imposed by our
national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction over alien defendants.
Under our proposal, Congress retains the flexibility to modify existing venue
or choice-of-law schemes to impose additional, subconstitutional restraints
on federal courts.248 Others have proposed such modifications,249 and these
may help reduce burdens on alien defendants even further.
C. Limits on Suits in State Courts
Venue transfer across state lines is not possible when the case is in state
court, but alien defendants have options there too. One option is removal to
federal court. Aliens can remove all federal-law cases from state court to
federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction and most state-law cases
based on alienage jurisdiction.250 Once in federal court, the alien defendant
can move to transfer to a more convenient state under the federal venue-
transfer rules.251 Of course, removal is not available for state-law claims if (1)
the amount in controversy is less than $75,000, (2) a plaintiff is an alien, or
(3) a co-defendant is a domestic citizen of the same state as one of the plain-
tiffs or of the forum state.252 But these occurrences are rare.253
246. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981) (“[T]here is ordinarily a
strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum . . . . [But] the presumption
applies with less force when the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign.”).
247. Professor Whytock did not code his sample for whether the defendant was an alien.
Whytock, supra note 245, at 502–03, 503 tbl.1. But it stands to reason that the chances of an
alien defendant succeeding on a forum non conveniens motion should not be less than the
chances of defendants in general.
248. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice
of Law Statutes, 80 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1991) (arguing that Congress has the constitutional author-
ity to pass a federal choice-of-law statute for multistate claims).
249. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 30, at 1338–40.
250. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332(a) (2012).
251. See supra Section III.B.
252. See § 1332(a). The seminal case World-Wide Volkswagen was such a case. See An-
dreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict of Laws: Federal, State, and International Perspec-
tives § 7.04, at 565 (1986). Removal also would not be possible in a state-law case if the alien
defendant is an individual who is a lawful permanent resident of the same state as at least one
plaintiff, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(2), 1441(a), but, in that case, the state likely would have
general personal jurisdiction over the resident alien independent of any national-contacts test.
As noted above, supra text accompanying note 248, Congress could modify the removal statute
to alleviate even these minor concerns of strategic or fraudulent joinder by plaintiffs to deny
removal.
253. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 40 (stating that alienage jurisdiction’s removal privilege
makes it rare that suits against alien defendants are heard in state courts). Alienage cases make
up a small fraction of the federal diversity docket. See id. at 5 n.19 (reporting about 7.3 percent
of diversity cases).
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In the rare instances in which removal is unavailable, the alien defen-
dant may ask the court to dismiss under the state’s doctrine of forum non
conveniens if the suit could be brought in another state or foreign court and
the alternative forum would be more appropriate. Most state forum non
conveniens doctrines follow the federal doctrine’s presumption in favor of
the plaintiff’s choice of forum.254 But assuming that state dismissal rates mir-
ror the federal rates,255 state forum non conveniens remains a viable option
for alien defendants even when the plaintiff is a U.S. resident.
D. Other Practical Protections
If these legal doctrines were not enough to protect alien defendants
from state-specific inconveniences in a personal jurisdiction regime founded
on national contacts, alien defendants can take matters into their own
hands. Defendants can enter into contracts with forum selection clauses that
limit the range of possible courts in which the signatory can sue the defen-
dant. Arbitration clauses, which are used widely around the world, are one
kind of forum selection clause and are specifically enforceable in federal
courts, even in a state-law case.256 Clauses that choose a particular judicial
forum are also generally enforceable.257 Forum selection clauses only work to
limit suits by another party to the contract. But with respect to such poten-
tial plaintiffs, they are an effective strategy.
With respect to other potential plaintiffs, an alien defendant who wishes
to avoid the burden of litigating in a U.S. court retains the option of default-
ing and resisting enforcement of the U.S. judgment.258 If the alien defendant
does not have assets in the United States against which a U.S. judgment can
254. See, e.g., Cortez v. Palace Resorts, Inc., 123 So. 3d 1085, 1091 (Fla. 2013) (noting that
the Florida Supreme Court had “adopted the federal test for dismissing an action on forum
non conveniens grounds”); see also Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States: Jurisdiction § 304 reporters’ note 2 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2016) (giving other examples).
255. See supra text accompanying note 245.
256. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2012).
257. See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: Jurisdiction § 302 reporters’ note 3 (discussing the exercise of jurisdiction by the
chosen court); id. § 304 reporters’ note 6 (discussing the dismissal of suit by a court not
chosen); see also Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1, 49–51 (2014) (discussing forum selection clauses). If the forum selection clause speci-
fies a U.S. federal court, venue transfer pursuant to the forum selection clause mandates that
the transferee court apply its own choice-of-law rules instead of those of the transferor court,
which curtails opportunities for plaintiffs to shop for favorable law. See Atl. Marine Constr.
Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582–83 (2013); see also Scott Dodson, Atlantic Marine
and the Future of Party Preference, 66 Hastings L.J. 675 (2015) (discussing Atlantic Marine and
its implications for venue transfer).
258. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982)
(“A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and
then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”).
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be enforced, the plaintiff will have to seek enforcement of the default judg-
ment in another country where the defendant does have assets. Many for-
eign jurisdictions will recognize and enforce U.S. default judgments when
personal jurisdiction is proper under our approach, but the cost and uncer-
tainty of this additional step will make it unattractive to bring suit against
many smaller alien defendants who lack U.S. assets. As a practical matter,
this simple fact may provide the greatest protection for Justice Breyer’s small
Egyptian shirtmaker or Kenyan coffee farmer.
* * *
In sum, under a national-contacts approach, alien defendants will con-
tinue to enjoy a range of practical and doctrinal protections against the pos-
sibility of a truly inconvenient or burdensome U.S. forum. On a practical
level, an alien can choose a convenient forum to resolve disputes with its
contract partners in a forum selection clause. If the alien defendant lacks
substantial assets in the United States, it can also default and resist enforce-
ment of the U.S. judgment abroad, a possibility that will discourage many
plaintiffs from bringing suit in the first place.
Larger alien defendants with assets in the United States are also likely to
have more resources to defend themselves in litigation. Here, a range of doc-
trinal tools become available. In both state and federal courts, alien defend-
ants are protected against extreme inconvenience by the reasonableness
requirement of the Due Process Clauses. For suits filed initially in federal
court, the option of venue transfer is available. For suits filed initially in state
court, motions to dismiss under state doctrines of forum non conveniens
will often be available, or the alien defendant may be able to remove the suit
to federal court and then move to transfer venue to a more convenient fed-
eral forum. These safeguards allow the minimum-contacts test for personal
jurisdiction over aliens to remain focused on national contacts.
Conclusion
We have advanced a national-contacts approach to personal jurisdiction
over aliens, and we have defended the approach on grounds of fairness, fed-
eralism, and practicality. Our goal has been to offer an attractive way to
resolve some of the Court’s open personal jurisdiction questions while
maintaining consistency with existing precedent. In the process, we hope our
contribution refocuses attention on alienage in personal jurisdiction, which
is likely to continue to generate significant litigation and commentary.
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